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ABSTRACT 
On June 6, 1980 California voters passed the Jarvis 
Gann Property Tax initiative, cutting statewide property taxes by 
57 percent and thereby reducing local government revenues by 
seven to eight billion dollars annually. 
The property tax initiative and location of Caltech 
within Pasadena provided a unique opportunity for a detailed case 
study of the manager council system of local government. 
JAWS I AND THE POLITICS OF BUDGETARY REDUCTION 
THE CITY OF PASADENA: A CASE STUDY 
Joel Balbien 
INTRODUCTION: PASADENA BEFORE JARVIS-GANN 
Pasadena is a general charter city of 108,000 people 
located at the western end of the San Gabriel Valley about twllve 
mil•• �rrh of Lo' Ang•l••· Fo�lly ir ha• a •Crong ��g•rf 
council system of government with the emphasis on a strong mana�er. 
 In Pasadena the City Manager's office has been divided into three 
parts: the City Manager, who is the chief executive of the clt 
and liaison between the Board and city staff, and his two asslsttants 
one in charge of advance planning and economic development, ald l anot 
who heads the Management Analysis Division, responsible for the 
efficient current operation of the city departments. The Cit� 
Manager's office helps set the agenda and controls much of thl 
information received by the seven members of the Board of Dirlctors. 
As a result, he has substant�al influence over city policy. 
The power of the City Manager's office is also strerigt 
by Pasadena's political system. There is no opposition part�11 a 
for issues that will enable it to regain power in the next e]ec 
 
As a result, elections become personality contests with candid 
ene 
arc 
ion. 
tes 
2 
and their supporters usually choosing the issues they want to raise. 
Moreover, electoral and organizatonal resources are concentrated 
in interest groups most often allied with office holders and the 
City Manager's office rather than being concentrated in party 
organization (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce, professional associa-
tions, service clubs, and the Tournament of Roses Committee, etc. ) 
Such organizations receive annual funding or grants form the City. 
Changes in· Pasadena's election laws have strengthened 
city-wide constituencies. Prior to 1920, city directors were 
elected by a majority vote of their districts. In 1920 progressive-
style municipal reforms swept the City. For the next fourty seven 
years directors were both.nominated and elected in city-wide elections. 
Since 1967 the election rules have been changed again. The seven 
members of the Board of Directors are now nominated in district 
primaries. A candidate receiving a majority of the total vote 
cast is the only candidate on the city-wide ballot. If no candidate 
receives a majority in the primary, the names of the two candidates 
with the highest number of primary votes are placed on the ballot. 
However, the system permits a candidate residing in a district to 
mount a city-wide write-in campaign against his district's nominee 
or nominees. As a result city-wide coalitions, e. g. , based on common 
economic interest or race, could utilize write-in campaigns to deny 
a district's nominee or nominees a place on the council. According 
to one candidate, this almost occured in the 1974 city-wide elections, 
when an unpopular incumbent nearly won reelection as a write-in 
candidate. 1 
Another major change in Pasadena government in tlie l:lecad 
prior to Jarvis Gann was brought about by a large infusion l of 
federal and state categorical grants, redevelopment funds and 
revenue sharing. As a result, the City was able to expandlinlbotH 
the diversity of government activity and the level of real lex endJ 
Table 1 indicates that real expenditures have grown by ovei s[x 
million dollars since 1970. This expansion of Pasadena se�ices 
made possible by federal assistance came in two phases: rldewelo 
of the downtown area, particularly in the early 1970s, folJowed 
by neighborhood redevelopment and human services after 197J . 
Downtown redevelopment in Pasadena illustrates a llobal 
program initiated by a coalition consisting of city staff, lelecte 
officials, and parts of the business community, and funded lint par 
inter-governmental transfers. Beginning in 1970 city offidia�s 
approved considerable GF expenditures on staffing, studies,I ahd 
promotion of downtown redevelopment, as well as a $87,000 P,er 
contribution to the Chamber of Commerce to promote economid ' 
2 I development in Pasadena. The City's Assistant City Manager 
year 
or 
fund 
nt 
Economic Developmenc •P�C •�eral �n year• pur•uing fede,'1 
and managing federally financed redevelopment programs. Thes 
efforco reou1'ed in federal f=ds for Che Paoade= Redevelt 
Agency (PRA) , which applied tax increment financing for land 
di•posicion and ammbly wiChin Paoade='' budnm di"ri,C. 
Among the notable successes in downtown redevelop,meib.t 
(financed by tax increment bonds and federal funds to suppolrt I the
PRA) were the Bank Americard Center, Parson's Complex, Pasadema 
I 
es. 
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Center Holiday Inn, and the Orange Grove Village, a 122 unit 
condominium townhouse development. 3 
5 
Loretta Glickman, a member of Pasadena's Board of Directors, 
claimed that a form of "power elite", including community leaders and 
businessmen pushed the concept of downtown redevelopment as well 
as particular projects: "Until a few years ago, a small group of 
people determined the future of the City. They decided a long time 
ago to redevelop downtown. That is why all the staff is for it. They 
were hired to be for it. ,.4 According to former city director
Robert Oliver, the members of Pasadena's redevelopment coalition were 
people from overlapping groups, including the Board of Directors, 
citizen advisory committees, city staff, Star News, the Chamber of 
5 Commerce, and the Tournament of Roses Committee. 
In all likelihood the City's Assistant City Manager for 
Economic Development, together with a former member of the PRA and 
Chairman of the Board of Mutual Savings, and with Pasadena Now (a 
select group of the more powerful members of the Pasadena Chamber of 
Commerce) were influential in guiding one important project, a 
regional shopping center, through a maze of administrative obstacles 
and opponents attempting to block its final approval. 6 One Board 
member (District 5 director for nine years) apparently strengthened 
the proponents' political power in Pasadena government between 
1969 and 1973 through strategic appointments to the two most powerful 
advisory commissions: the Resource Allocation Committee (R. A. C. ) 
and the Planning Commission.7 
6 
These appointments also enabled the redevelopmentl cdalit 
to plan the City's capital budget. According to one high of 
its power base also extended into the City Manager's officl 
into some city departments. 
However, Pasadena's ambitious redevelopment policie 
b• our<ail•d in <h• fu<or•. Th•r• io g•n•ral agr••�n< <h•f 
the limitations imposed by Jarvis-Gann tax increment finanri 
dead in California. Judy Hopkinson, PRA Assistant Executi�e 
icia 
nd 
may 
nder 
g is 
Director, commented in May 1978: "There will never be anolther 
at 
pai 
tax increment bond sold in the State of California if Jar�i'is 
passes . . •  n8 Moreover, with real estate assessments ris(n 
only 1 percent per year under Jarvis-Gann, it is questionabl 
whether the existing tax increment debt will ever be ful1Yi11 r 
The Los Angeles Times reported that as a result of Propos�tibn 1 
$58 million in bonds sold by the Pasadena Redevelopment AJen�y 
could go into default. 9 Fortunately for Pasadena, the CiJy s no: 
legally obligated to repay tax increment debt. 
Nevertheless, Pasadena's redevelopment projects liav 
forced local street improvements and expansion of the CitJ's I structure because of a growing demand for sewerage, natural 
and electricity. Although users have shared additional clp 
costs through higher service charges, federal transfers, la 
I 
General Revenue Sharing and Federal Urban Aid, which the 8i 
receives with few strings attached, have provided additiola 
for infrastructure improvements. 
inf 
as, 
ity 
fun 
•ly 
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From 1975 to 1980 the City used over a million dollars 
per year in Federal Revenue Sharing funds completely for capital 
improvements. According to city officials, this practice stemmed 
from conservative management procedures. "Revenue sharing is here 
today, but uncertain in the future • • . .  Financial managers don't 
want the City to get hooked on revenue sharing in order to balance 
the budget. 1110 Thus, unless the City faced a serious financial
crisis (such as might occur in a recession or with the passage of 
Jarvis-Gann), GRS funds were used for specific capital programs 
selected and ranked according to priorities set by the powerful 
Resource Allocation Committee (RAC). * 
The use of revenue sharing funds for some capital projects 
tended to raise tax-supported General Fund (GF) expenditures in 
future years through increased operations and maintenance costs. 
The City Manager cited two projects funded by revenue sharing, 
freeway landscaping and a recreation center, as raising the City's 
operating costs. The recreation center was a major addition to 
facilities (see Table 1). 11 
Pasadena's recent endeavors in the areas of human services 
and neighborhood rehabilitation have also increased�.loc::al0·government 
costs. Th e City Manager's FY 1979 budget recommendations, prepared 
prior to the passage of Jarvis-Gann, stated: II • .  in the past 
five years the city has initiated over sixty new programs. Pasadena 
is involved in a wide spectrum of activities including Helicopter 
*With the passage of Jarvis-Gann, the City plans to shift general 
revenue sharing funds from its capital to operating budget beginning 
in FY 1980. 
8 
TABLE 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE SHARING FUNDS WITHIN 
PASADENA'S CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS PROGRAM 
Project Category 
Parks & Recreation 
Traffic Control 
Municipal Bldg. & 
Facilities 
Landscaping & 
Street Trees 
Electric Systems 
Water Systems 
Street Improvements 
Street Lighting 
Street Lighting 
Related to 
Under grounding 
of Utilities 
Storm Drains 
Sewers 
Golf Course 
Pre-Jarvis 
Total Cost 
77-83 
$ 7,444,000 
1,759,400 
12,276,000 
1,970,500 
41,901,500 
7,2H,550 
22,298,000 
3 ,579,000 
1,3 43 ,000 
1,964,000 
2,63 9,000 
267,000 
* General Revenue Sharing 
Percentage of 
I
Carital 
Budget Funded in Part 
or Completely by GRS� 
58 
47 
3 6  
32. 7  
0 
0 
3 0  
28.6 
0 
9 
0 
0 
Source: City of Pasadena, "City Manager's Budget Recomme�daltiom 
Fiscal Year 1979," May 9, 1978: pp. 4-2 to 4-62. 
9 
Patrol, hamburger-content analysis, six separate housing rehabilitation 
loan programs, cultural heritage and human services activities. New 
programs begun since FY 1974 now account for $ 8.6 million of the 
12 
annual budget. " 
These new programs consumed state and local as well as 
federal revenues. For example, in FY 1977-'78 the City established 
a commission on the status of women (see Table 2), supported by the 
general fund to provide a liaison between women in the community and 
the city government. Such programs increased the City's administrative 
costs. Although federal categorical programs such as the Comprehensive 
Employment Training Act (CETA), which provides public service jobs 
for minorities, low income people, or the unemployed, and Community 
Development Block Grants (CDBG) set aside some funds to cover 
administrative cost, an official in the Pasadena Planning Department 
stated that it required four people funded in part by the general 
fund to administer the City's CDBG projects. 13 He estimated that
smaller grants of between $ 50,000 and $ 100,000 require 25 percent 
of a man year to administer. 14 
Federal and state grants, E. G. , CETA and NSF, also enabled the 
I 
City to support both blue and white collar personnel that could not be 
locally funded. For example, a science advisor could be sheltered with 
federal money when local revenues declined. 15 However, since 1970 
the impact of federal and state programs on the number of full time 
staff (FTE) employed by the City does not appear significant, being 
overshadowed by manpower savings associated with the adoption of 
data processing and administrative changes made by a new city 
manager. 
Program: 
f.ccount: 
Department: 
TABLE 2 
NEW LOCAL PROGRAMS AND COMMUNITY INTEREST GROUPS 
Ccnrnission on the SUtus of Women 
138 
Personnel 
Fund: !if!ne 
Ii Ii 10 
al 
f.ctual Budgeted I ropo�e,. 
REGULAR EMPLOYEES 
WORK HOURS 
EXPENDITURES 
Personnel 
Regular Salaries 
Other Salaries 
Fringe Benefits and Other 
Total Personnel 
Services and Supplies 
Maten a 1 s and Supplies 
General Services Supply Store 
Services, Contracts, Rentals 
Travel and Educational 
Auto Allowance and Gasoline 
Audiovisual and Reference Material 
Telephone, Utilities, Postage 
Other Operating Services 
Subtotal 
General Services Charges 
Total Services and Supplies 
Capital Acquisitions 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 
llli.:ll. -1lli.:Z§. 
5,520
$ $ 28,768
28,768
s $ 28,768
1978-719
Ill 5.s2t 
s 16,2257J� 21,:J� 50 
1.2$; 
12' 
1,��: 
701 
2,4�i 
II 
b,b(I: 
5 891 
12,56! 
l si 
Ill
36,09
1 
see S SOJ 
nd pther ll gov �rnmen�, , a n annual 
oca P wo- II its effort 
S' 
mea ins of 
DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM: The Commission on the Status of Women studies and 
tions to women's problems, recommends alternatives, and provides referral a 
services. Acting as a liaison between women in the community and the City 
the Commission conducts such outreach efforts as monthly community meetings 
conference, issue committees made up of local women, and interaction with 1 
men's organizations. The Commission assists the City employment system in 
to comply with the law and principles of equal employment opportunities by 
input to the Management Development and Affirmative Action Programs as well as a re-
view of the City's four hundred job classifications. 
ron City 
I 
WORK PLAN: Answer 2000 inquiries from the community as well as referrals fi 
staff; maintain a talent bank of 500 women to assist the Board of Directors 
pointments to other advisory bodies; conduct nine single-issue workshops, q 
issue conference, and at least twelve communit} meetings reaching over 1000 
issue a bi-monthly newsletter to 2000 Pasadena women; maintain seven issue I (75 citizens participating) and publish informatfon for Pasadena women on� 
of Child Care, Education, Employment, Leadership Development, Violence Agai 
tnd Media; continue interaction with 50 local organizations concerned with 
ir ap-
ne Jnulti-
wr )lien; , 
cor tnittees 
he issues 
nsi Women 
issues. 
wor en• s I i 
Source: City of Pasadena, "City Manager's Budget Recommendations Fiscal Yea: r ir;i 79, II 
May 9, 1978: pp. 2-30. 
l 
TABLE 3 
PROGRAM: AuditinQ and Special Services 
ACCOUNT: 119 
EMPLOYEES 
Regular Full Time 
Other (Converted to F. T .E . } 
!Q.TAL EMPLOYEES 
EXPENDITURES 
FY 1978 
� 
6.0 
6.0 
FUND: 
DEPARTH::NT: 
FY 1979 
� 
9.0 
9.0 
Personnel 
Regular Salaries $ 43,221 $ 91,043 $ 
Other Salaries 616 
Benefits and Misc. Pay 23,330 
Subtotal Personnel 67, 167 
Non-Personal 
Services and Supp 1 i es 21,824 
General Services Charges 13,206 
Subtota 1 Non-Persona 1 35,030 
Capital Acquisition -
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $ 102, 197 
�: Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) 
Genera 1 Fund 
-
34,480 
125,523 
19,986 
6,514 
26,500 
-
$ 152,023 $ 
$ 
TOTAL REVENUE $ 
11 
General 
Finance 
FY 1980 
� 
11.0 
11.0 
205,522 
-
74,360 
279,882 
47 ,832 
6,373 
54,205 
500 
334,587 
28,881 
305, 706 
334,587 
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION: The Auditing and Special Services program provides: auditing 
of the City's internal financial controls and of subcontractors under Federal Grants; 
specialized accounting services to the Local Housing Authority and the Fire and Police 
Retirement System; and liaison between independent outside auditors and City staff. 
MAJOR CHANGES FROM FY 1979: Accounting for the Local Housing Authority has been trans­
ferred to this program from the Housing and Community Development Department. 
FY 1980 WORK PLAN: 
-Audit 26 payrolls 
-Review at least 15 daily disbursement registers 
-Perfonn 6 audits of offsite revenue collections 
-Monitor 10 audits by independent public accountants 
Source: City Manager's Budget Reconnnendations FY 1980. Pasadena, 
California, May 10, 1979. 
11' 
Thus, in the decade pr ior to Jarvis-Gann, new lareas o 
local government concern in Pasadena -- downtown redevelo I new p11og human services underwent r apid growth. These 
consumed local as well as state and federal revenues. 
PASADENA'S EARLY RESPONSE TO JARVIS-GANN 
This section describes the response of Pasaden 
to Jarvis-Gann and outlines the factors that conditionld 
 
ment 
ams 
response. Proposition 13 was brief,'combining legal sim�L1c1nM1 
 with bluntness and brevity. However, because of its sim 
ambiguous working and uncertainty over how the federal [ a 
government would respond to Proposition 13's passage, it twas 
impossible for local governments to calculate an exact [ f�scal 
impact. As a result many city, county, and school of�fc�als �I 
little fiscal planning before the election. Their primaJy res 
 to the initiative was to formally oppose it and warn of duts 
vital services if Jarvis-Gann passed. 
Some cities, such as Pasadena, developed a ranee of 
impacts that were used in budgetary planning and politkc�l po 
well in advance of Proposition 131 s passage on June 6. 
the city staff's preparation and directors' approval of
(June and July) were gr�atly facilitated. Furthermorel
 was well prepared after the primary to lobby the legisia 
a 
he a 
a sad 
ure 
a share of the r educed property tax base and the statel' s I five
dollar surplus. 
d 
ls 
nse 
cal 
ring 
ult, 
al budget 
llion 
13 
However, interviews with city offic ials suggest Pasadena 
acted early primarily because the City's staff was against the 
initiative and sought to inform community and c ity employees of 
the initiative's probable impact on jobs, programs, and services. 
The City's top management hoped their efforts would 
mobilize opposition to Jarvis-Gann among public -employee unions, 
low-income people, and neighborhood groups. Discussing the planning 
of a Jarvis-Gann budget, the City Manager wrote in his first Jarvis-
Gann report to the directors: "It is hoped that the Board's decision 
could be made prior to the end of March so that sufficient time 
c ould be available for the media to disseminate this information 
to the c ommunity. 1116 A representative of the Firefighters Association 
c ommented that although he felt he was being used by management to 
encourage c ommunity opposition to Proposition 13, he c ouldn't take 
the c hance that proposed c losure of stations and resulting layoffs 
of firemen were scare tac tics. 17 The initiative was a threat to 
firefighters and to community fire protection. As a union represen-
tative he had to protec t union members, whic h meant opposition to 
18Proposition 13. 
Thus the first phase'in the City's response to Jarvis-Gann 
was mobilization of public opposition to the tax cut initiative. This 
was done by public izing an agenda of service reduc tions and layoffs 
and exaggerating the fiscal impact of Proposition 13 (see Figure II). 
For example, in February the Management Analysis Division (MAD) 
calculated upper and lower limits of cuts in Pasadena's GF that they 
believed would occur if Proposition 13 passed. 
114 
LOSS OF PROPERTY TAXES 
Limitation under Jarvis-Gann 
Estimated Loss 
February 21, 1978 
Ap
. 
ti.jal L< 
FY ]979 
1 percent tax rate limitation $ 7,718,359 $ 6,q68, 
Potential loss of all property taxes 2,468,843 
Estimated range of revenue losses 7,691,695 - 10,187,2d2 
Source: City of Pasadena, "Information Report Jarvis Gann Tax 
Limitation Initiative," (February 21, 1978): p. 8. 
J. 7 
TABLE 4 
Do you agree or disagree that there would be drastic c uts in important 
local services if Jarvis-Gann passed? 
CUTS For Against Undecided INCOME < $8,000/yr. 
Agree 0 85.7 14.3 
Disagree 69.2 15.4 15.4 
Total sample 31.4 34.3 34.3 
CUTS For Against Undecided INCOME $8,000-12,000 
Agree 28.6 71.4 0 
Disagree 50.0 35. 7 14.3 
Total sample 36.4 36.4 27.3 
CUTS For Against Undecided INCOME $12,000-20,000 
Against 42.9 50.1 7.1 
Disagree 74.1 3.7 22.2 
Total sample 55.6 18.5 25.9 
CUTS For Against Undecided INCOME $20,000-30,000 
Agree 11.1 88.9 0 
Disagree 53.8 30.8 15.4 
Total sample 39.0 39.0 22.0 
CUTS For �ainst Undecided INCOME > $30,000 
Agi;:oae �� �.l 75.4 3.5 
Disagree 66.1 16.1 17.5 
1 
The Board of Directors and senior staff were also tlivided 
over the approach to budget c utting. The direc tors initiall� lavore 
across-the-board cuts in department budgets because flat perbe tage
reductions appear politically neutral and are simple to impllm nt.22 
However, the staff was strongly opposed to the c onclp t  of
ac ross-the-board reductions. (Pasadena's annual budget is o�ganize 
into department budgets which are further divided into spec�i 
programs or tasks.)23 Instead they favored program reductio s
might result in a few programs of high quality rather than Jari 
quality services. A union representative seemed to agree �th 
budg" oue<ing philo•ophy wh� he ocaced• " • • •  le i• ••+fU 
cut across the board because if you don't have enough personnel to 
do a job properly, you might as well eliminate the entire tJsk 1124
Dennis 01 Rourke, administrative assistant in MAD, laddled 
the following criticisms of across-the-board cuts: 
• • • they ignore relative levels of federal funding 
(significant in human services and HCD), loss of CETA 
funds, relative labor intensity of departments, 
differences in labor contracts and the revenue-raising 
function of some departments (i.e., Clerk, Finance, 
and HCD). 25
However, there were additional reasons for top management's !strong 
preference for budget c uts targeted at specific programs ra�h
L
. e 
than flat percentage cuts. The City Manager and his assista t 
felt that c ertain departments were relatively more inefficielt and 
proposed c ost reductions that were under c onsideration well lbetore 
19 
26 the tax revolt. For example, based on a study by an independent 
consultant, the City Manager proposed the closure of Fire Station 3 
in both the FY 1979 budget, prepared before Proposition 13 became 
an important issue, and the Jarvis-Gann budget. 2 7  He believed that 
consolidation of at least two stations could save the City money 
without reducing the level of fire protection. While Pasadena's 
fire chief did not disagree with the consolidation of two stations, he 
felt that in general, "Decisions to close fire stations are based 
on politics, not economics or science. 112 8  He also concluded that
threatened cuts in firefighting manpower inspired by Jarvis-Gann 
would have reduced the level of fire protection. 2 9
Privatization o f  certain public works activities was 
another policy option investigated by the City well before the 
election. The City Manager argued that independent studies and 
experience with refuse collection indicated that contracting out to 
the private sector might be 25 percent cheaper than public enterprise. 30 
However, the public employee unions sharply disagreed, countering 
that private contractors provide lower quality services and invite 
political corruption through the contract selection process. Propositi-
tion 13 provided top management with an opportunity to propose these 
controversial policies in a political environment favorable towards 
budget cuts and improving productivity in local government. However, 
the City Manager recognized that layoffs of public employees, whether 
to improve efficiency or save money, were politically sensitive. "It 
is much easier to cut staff from public works than from library, fire 
and police because the latter have well organized and vocal 
constituencies. 1131
(l 
PREPARING AN AGENDA OF CUTS 
In January 1978, five months before the election,[ tllle 
Management Analysis Division, with the consent of the Board, evelii>llile<l II the agenda of fifty cost reductions and seventeen revenue ibc eases] 
' rombi=Uon of which roold �ee <he Ciey'• maximum lo" ,, mo:: 
I under Jarvis-Gann. After receiving feedback from the divisio 
the City Manager presented the agenda to the Board of Diredto 
February 2 1. Interviews with city staff suggested that afjer 
February 2, 1978 the heads of the service departments had Jittle i 
any participation in assigning priorities to or planning fdr 
Proposition 13 budget cuts. 32 Their involvement was limitJd 
ch±�L . 
by the City's Charter, which precludes direct verbal commuJic
Thus, futjre
policy recommendations concerning Jarvis-Gann were developJd 
by 'he Ci'Y Mao•ger •nd hie aro a••i•C•o'' wich ''affing •1••
from the heads of Finance, Personnel, and the Management Anal 
between civil servants and elected officials. 33 
Division. Public employee unions also did not participate lin 
the package of budget cuts or in assigning priorities to SP,ec 
reductions. 34 Therefore it is not surprising that union sJok 
who attended Pasadena City Board meetings were sharply:criJic
the proposed package as well as of the priority groups of jed 
developed later. Unions also assisted in generating commuJit
opposition to specific cuts, particularly closure of fire Jta 
and branch libraries. 35 
s on 
urth: 
tiJ 
xclufm 
tandl 
sis II deve; 
fie 
sme
l 1 01 
ctio 
ions 
The City 
decision-making as 
Manager explained management's hierarchic�l 
follows: "Proposition 13 forced major lhajnges 
ely 
ing 
21 
the structure of local government . • . •  There has never been a 
radical restructuring of an institution by participation, under a 
time constraint. I believe in centralized authority to get things 
done. A cooperative effort by city employees and the department 
heads to cut government spending in the spirit of a truth-love 
model of administrative organization, by the July l deadline, would 
have collapsed because of self-interest. 1136 As a result, decisions 
concerning Proposition 13 were made at the highest levels of the 
City's management and by the Board of Directors. 
No doubt, if implemented, the cost reduction outlined in 
the first Jarvis-Gann report would have had a major impact on both 
city services and city employees. This supports the thesis that the 
agenda was designed to mobilize both public and union opposition to 
Jarvis-Gann. The complete package would have required a total 
reduction of 380 employees or 2 4  percent of the City's work force, 
including seventy three CETA-funded employees. 37 
These layoffs would have disrupted Pasadena's Affirmative 
Action efforts. For example, of the seventy three CETA positions to 
be eliminated, fifty seven were minority people and thirty three 
38 . were women. Moreover, among union-represented employee groups, 
layoffs would have been made on the basis of seniority, as required 
in contracts. Thus women and minorities would suffer most. The 
complete package of budget cuts would have reduced Pasadena's total 
women and minority work force by 39 percent. 39 
The complete package of service reductions called for closure 
of fire stations, elimination of some police services such as the 
2 
Helicopter Patrol, and major cutbacks in library services and 
public works. Examining Table 5 several patterns emerge. The 
largest absolute reductions in staffing and budgets were in llb 
I intensive departments (i. e. , public works, fire and police prot 
Ir-
:ctionJ 
and libraries). Personnel, salaries, and fringe benefits arel ttie 
single largest factor in the cost of local government, totaling 
60. 5 percent of Pasadena's FY 1977-1978 department operating buqget. 
The Table also suggests that the architect(s) of the agenda fll 
I that the Board of Directors and library departments show�d the 
greatest potential for cuts on a percentage basis, suggestinglttiat 
the services of those departments were either inefficiently p odured 
or less important to management. 40 In contrast, the smaller �etcenta 
cuts in the GF budgets of Human Services and Housing and Commlnity 
Development may have reflected local costs necessary to maintli 
foderal and e <a<e progra�. Rerall rhar peraon�l in R-n J1.,c'<iree 
and HCD manage the county health and federal CDBG and CETA programs. 
The minuerule redurrioM propoeed in rhe Fi�nre Deparrmenr +dter 
reflected its revenue raising, auditing, and accounting funcbio�s, 
roMidered eririral by ��.��r ro rhe Ciry'e operarinne . 41 
This first group of reductions developed by the City 
Manager's office and MAD represented staff's priorities as td the 
direction and form that Proposition 13 budget cuts should taJe.
The Ciry Manager �de ir rlear rhar �nage�nr rould li� wi1h lhe 
entire package of budget cuts. Thus the list of proposed reductions 
was a feasible subset, selected by staff, of all possible coJt 
reductions. It preserved the basic administrative structure lof 
Pasadena government. 
Board 
City Manager 
City Attorney 
City Clerk 
City Prosecutor 
Finance 
Personnel 
Fire 
HCD* 
Human Services 
Library 
Police 
Public Works 
(1) Total 
General Services 
City Wide 
Water & Power 
CETA 
TABLE 5 
IMPACT OF FIRST PACKAGE ON DEPARTMENTS 
FEBRUARY 21, 1978 
FY77-78 G.F.B. 20 Percent Total Staff 
Less Federal, Cut in Recommended 
State Grants Department Reduction/ 
in G.F. Budgets Avoidance 
Feb. 21, '78 
$ 214. 394 $ 42,879 95,200 
590.191 118,038 115,588 
243,939 48,788 31,030 
138,819 27' 764 23,540 
229,361 45,872 35,310 
2,491,865 498,373 136,000 
554,255 110,851 134,300 
5,664,758 1,432,952 1,080,700 
1,203,660 240, 732 152,640 
1,345,612 269,122 68,558 
2,514,735 502,947 792,000 
9,858,399 1,971,680 1,022,568 
8,439,222 1,687,844 2,447,500 
33,489,210 6, 697' 842 
5,294,312 280,366 
37,056,882 150,000 
0 297,422 
126,000 66,000 
6,631,300 
*HCD = Housing and Community Development. 
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Personnel 
Impact 
(Equiv.) 
2 
4 
2 
2 
1 
5 
7.75 
41.4 
8.0 
5 
31 
30 
145.7 
10 
13 
73 
380.8 
Source: City of Pasadena, "Information Report Jarvis Gann Tax Limitation 
Initiative." (February 21, 1978). 
Cuts as a 
Percentage 
FY 1978 
Budget 
44.4 
19.6 
12.7 
17.0 
15.4 
5.5 
24.2 
19.1 
12.6 
5.1 
31.4 
12.5 
31.3 
5.3 
.4 
J. 
The package did not include a number of alterna  as: a four day work week; employee hiring freezes; reneg 
cost-of-living increases; across-the-board cuts in mana�e 
personnel; cuts in the City's transportation budget; pr�v, 
of general services, police, fire, legal and accounting! a 
major reorganization of city departments to eliminate dup 
I . and reevaluation of the General Fund cost of some f ederlal 
programs such as redevelopment. Some of these alternaoiv 
reductions were proposed for consideration by individuJl 
or adopted after the elections. Perhaps the public inJer 
have been served if the City's staff had presented the IBo 
a complete set of potential cost-reductions. 
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The first list of potential Jarvis-Gann cuts lalso hat 
disorganized in the sense that program cuts were not ranked 
particular order or assigned to priority groups. 
riorities to orooosed euts was a second critical 
response to Jarvis-Gann. Although the City executives lin�o 
directors that they needed policy guidelines before makin
decisions, the City Manager offered to ·assign his priolit
y 
of 
r 
he 
proposed list of reductions if the Board wanted him to I dol so. ,wever 
m�d-management and other public employees pr€ferred that 
an elected body, assign priorities to service reductiols 
layoffs. Nevertheless, the directors, demonstrating cln 
the City Manager, and desiring information in a concisl 
form, agreed to consider his priority groups of reductio 
received on March 16, 1978, less than three months beflr 
d, 
oyee 
ized 
s, wlJ!:ii
r
n they 
the lli!IJlimary. 
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Political considerations apparently played a major role in 
the City Manager's ranking of budget cuts within departments and the 
organization of reductions into priority groups. 42 Some constituencies
were spared having high priorities assigned to budget cuts in favored 
services while other groups were less fortunate. For example, consider 
the City's Public Works Department (PW). Mandatory PW commercial and 
curbside rubbish collection was ranked seventh among eight cuts. 
Yet curbside as opposed to backyard collection (which was extremely 
popular among both wealthy and elderly citizens) could have saved the 
City's GF $500,000 per year. 43 Moreover, privatization of Public
Works activities didn't even make the City Manager's priority list. 
In contrast, the highest priorities were assigned to major 
budget cuts in fire and library services, suggesting the City Manager 
wished to further mobilize opposition to Proposition 13 among the 
politically influential supporters of these services, even though he 
knew that such cuts would be nearly impossible to pass. An alternative 
explanation is that he sincerely believed that the Fire Department 
was overstaffed and the branch libraries underutilized, and pursued 
the cuts even though he knew they would be unpopular. Under recommended 
fire reductions, the closure of three stations accompanied by the 
layoff of 37. 4 fire fighters was ranked first followed by reclassifica-
tion of positions (which reduced the income of fire engineers), and 
reduction of management levels (which would have eliminated the 
management of the Fire Department). 44
For the Library Department, closure of all branch libraries, 
a savings of $679,000 and a reduction of twenty-seven personnel, was 
ranked first, followed by reduction in administration. 
Priority 
and then 
2 
Table 6 shows the potential impact of the City Manager's 
Group I set of cuts on department budgets and persohn�l, 
compares the City Manager's recommendations to Boark-
approved actions completed by May 16, 1978. 
As evident in Table 5 and Figure III, the final cuts agree 
r's 
ed 
in 
to by the directors differed significantly from the City Manlg 
reco�nde<i�•· Prior co <he elecci�, <he direc<or• e"<hori 
cuts of $4,155,899 in expenditures and deferment of $1,186, 700 
capital projects. This released GRS funds for use in general 
for the first time since 1975. 45 
II peratlll!4ms 
In addition, the directors cut the City's transponta 
budget, doubled staff recommended reductions in human serviJes 
the City Manager's office, cut the budget for HCD by five time 
staff recommendation, and approved modest reductions in their 
department. Finally, the directors ordered a 1 percent cut i 
city services supported by GF. The final package of cuts, if 
implemented, would have eliminated 157 positions. 46 As canl b  
ion 
and 
the 
wn 
all 
seJ 
Boa:m in Table 10, the biggest reversal for the City Manager was th 
rejection of major cuts in fire operations. Yielding to th1 
of public opinion, "No fire stations were ordered closed anl rlo on 
I 
eigJ 
In additio,+> 
although ordering major reductions in operating hours, the Board 
line fire or police personnel were eliminated. 1147 
refused to close the City's branch libraries. 
s 
TABLE 6 
COMPARISON OF CITY MANAGER'S rRIORITY GROUP I 
TO BOARD-APPROVED CUTS 
City Manager's I�pact 
I
Board Approved Impact 
Priority Group I % FY78 J on Cuts 7. F March 16, 1978 G.F. Budget Staff ., May 1978 G.F. l 
� Y78 
�dget 
Board 
City Manager {City Attorney 
* City Clerk 
City Prosecutor 
Finance 
Personnel 
Fire 
HCD 
Humari Services 
Library 
Police 
Public Works 
General Services 
City Wide 
Water & Power 
CETA 
Total 
$ 67,200 
47,080 
11,770 
35,310 
23,540 
136,000 
28,000 
903,080 
32,419 
64,537 
679,000 
83,140 
1,654,500 
272,000 
150,000 
0 . 
126,000 
$4,313,576 
31.3 
8.0 
11.5 
11.5 
11.5 
5.5 
5�0 
15.9 
2.7 
4.8 
27.0 
.8 
19.6 
5.14 
.4 
0 
100.00 
t 
l· 
2.0 
!.o 
I 
5. j.75 
3�.4 
lj : : 
21.0 
.8 
2f o 
l 
* These proposed cuts represent a consolidation of bookkee 
$ 56,000 
115,588 
31,030 
o.o 
0.0 
136,000 
64,000 
177 ,620 
152,640 
146,939 
400,500 
231,053 
1,880,047 
83,000 
615,482** 
0 
66,000 
$4,155,899 
26.1 
19.6 
12.7 
o. 
0. 
5.5 
11.5 
3.1 
12.6 
10.9 
15.9 
2.3 
22.3 
1.57 
0 
0 
4 
2 
0 
0 
5 
4.75 
6. 
8. 
18. 
15. 
10. 
9. 
2 
0 
0 
73 
157.0 
**Thia total includes a one percent across-the-board cut i the total General Fund budget and a $57,443.00 
reduction in the citywide travel budget. 
Sources: City of Pasadena, "Jarvis-Gann In"tiative Proposition 13," (March 16, 
1978); Management An alysis Divisio , City of Pasadena, May 1978. 
Impact of 
Jarvis-Gann on 
No. of FTE 
Employees 
2000 
1500 
1000 
500 
F IGURE 
868.0 
0 I 
71 72 73 74 75 
�u..LJ ictual 
· - u a pproved 5/78 
Manager Rec. 5/78 
6 77 78 79 80 Bl 
Source: City Manager's l Office, City of Pasadena. 
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REVENUE INCREASES 
Examination of the list of potential revenue-raising measures 
presented to the Board before the election reveals the following. 
Unlike county agencies and school districts some cities were capable 
of recovering tax revenues lost because of Proposition 13 if local 
officials wanted to raise fees and taxes (see Table 7). In fact, 
a loophole in Proposition 13 enabled cities to raise taxes without a 
two-thirds approval of the electorate, if they acted before the July 1 
deadline. However, while approving $2,213,000 in increased fees, taxes, 
and service charges, Pasadena's Board of Directors considered most 
proposals for tax increases politically unwise. 
The revenue increases the Board disapproved seem consistent 
with their desire for reelection. All proposals for increased 
business or real-estate taxes and fees, again with the exception of 
an occupancy-inspection-fee, were rejected, suggesting the importance 
of the business community in Pasadena's non-partisan citywide elections. 
Business and real-estate taxes were dismissed by the entire Board 
despite the fact that it was estimated that two-thirds of the 
Proposition 13 tax savings would go to businesses and landlords. 
Facing the prospect of major reductions in future city 
revenues·, the City Manager suggested in June 1978 that the Board 
approve a standby 1 percent city payroll ·tax as a contingency against 
severe cuts in revenues which might follow the initiative's passage. 
However, the Board unanimously rejected the proposal following strong 
b. . f . . 48 o Jections rom constituents. 
The largest tax increase approved by the directors was a 
TABLE 7 
PASADENA: REVENUE INCREASE ALTERNATIVES 
BUSINESS TAXES AND FEES 
�ccepted by the Board 
�ejected: 
Business Tax 
Business License 
Total Rejected 
REAL ESTATE TAXES AND FEES
ESTIMATED 
REVENUE INCREASE 
$ 0 
110,750 
1,500,000. 
$1,610,750 
A�TUAII 
R�VEmi.. 
r 
:o 
li'.78-79 
irNCREASE 
�ccepted: 
Occupancy Inspection 106,875 I 1$ 2tlllll875 
Rejected: 
5% Property Transfer Tax 
Construction Tax 
Building Permits 
Total Tax Rejected 
CONSUMER TAXES AND SERVICE CHARGES
Approved: 
Ambulance Fees 
Recreation Fees 
Overdue Library Books 
Parking 
$ 
350,000 
90, 750,-., 
293,000 
733,750 
48,000' ' 
100,000 
30,000 
55,625 
150,000 
52,500 
1,600,000 
� 884 -d 318
II 
* 
* 
2 000 
II * 1,4� 000 
Mandatory Commercial Trash 
Non-Business Licenses 
Utility Tax 
Total Tax Approved $2,036,125 II I * 
Rejected: 
Utility User's Fee 
Sewer Use Charge 
1% Payroll Tax 
Total Tax Rejected 
*Not applicable.
**No data available. 
4,404,648 
286,000 
4,000,000 
$8,690,648 
Sources: City Manager's Budget Recommendations FY 1980, Mayl lQ, 19 
Finance Director, City of Pasadena, December 1979. 
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utility user's tax that the staff estimated would raise $1,600,000 
for the General Fund. The City Manager commented that " . . .  our 
studies found that the SLAC tax was less regressive than the property 
tax.1149
Low-income and elderly people tend to spend a higher 
proportion of their income on energy and food. Thus a utility 
user's tax is more regressive than a proportional income tax or 
excise tax but perhaps less regressive than the property tax. 
Yielding to the argument of regressivity, the Board voted to exempt 
a customer's first 200 KW hrs. of electricity from the SLAC tax.50
Thus the City of Pasadena sought to remove voter uncertainty 
over the impact of the initiative on city services, and therefore 
responded to Jarvis-Gann prior to the election. However, the City 
spoke with two voices. Initially the City's staff sought to influence 
public opinion by exaggerating the fiscal impact of the measure and 
encouraging the Board to offer the public a promise to cut both 
vital and discretionary services if the initiative passed. But the 
Board, under the impetus of political rationality, refused to cut any 
police or fire services, instead offering more modest reductions in 
less essential services. As the measure strengthened in the polls, 
the City Manager pushed for revenue increases that would compensate 
in future years for the loss in property taxes. While the Board of 
Directors did approve some new fees, they were responsive to politically 
influential constituencies in Pasadena and voted down most tax 
increases. 
2 
FIRST YEAR IMPACT OF JARVIS-GANN I 
This final section surveys the first year impact df the 
passage of Jarvis-Gann on the City of Pasadena. gis.Lai\:ll);fe 
action following the passage of Proposition 13, Pasadena's act 
revenue loss in FY 1978-'79 was considerably less than the jos 
optimistic projections made by the city staff (see page 13)
the League of California Cities and other pro-city lobbyistJ pbr"""'Hll!>H 
a reluctant state legislature to continue providing cities lit 
share of the remaining property taxes collected under the lip 
limit. As a result, Pasadena received $3,255,311 in property 
revenue in FY 1979. 
Next the legislature allocated to cities two billio 
in bail-out funds from the state's surplus. As a result Pala 
 collected an additional 2.4 million dollars in revenue.51 To
with other new funding sources, the state bail out reduced lh 
loss of revenue under Jarvis-Gann from 17.3 percent to 6.8 be 
of the projected General Fund. 
tax 
dol 
ena 
FY 
cent 
Because of the City's improved financial positioru t�e 
r•vol< had a mini>al impac< � ci<y ''�'''' in FY 1979 l
Out of 157 layoffs approved in May 1978, Pasadena reported! 
eliminated only ninety seven positions with sixty two layo£fs152 
As a result much of Pasadena's preelection planning became l'much 
about nothing.' The City was able to expand its police fo�celby 
fifty five officers, transfer 2.2 million dollars in first1year 
bail out funds to a capital reserve and delay transf ering GRS 
to general operations until FY 1980.53 
s 
9 
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However, analysis of the FY 1979 and FY 1980 budgets 
suggests that Proposition 13 has brought subtle but perhaps lasting 
changes to local government. For example, in FY 1979 Pasadena began 
a major reassessment of its multi-year capital spending budget. 
Almost all categories of planned capital spending will be reduced 
in FY 1980 with the biggest cuts in municipal building and facilities 
and Parks and Recreation, which experienced rapid growth in recent 
years. The austere capital budget suggests at best a much slower 
growth in the City's infrastructure, and at worst a more rapid 
deterioration in capital facilities. 54 These sharp reductions, 
which do not appear justified by the loss of revenues, may also 
indicate a period of retrenchment in capital spending in response 
to mounting 0 & M costs associated with previous expansion. 
Jarvis-Gann also brought significant change in the relative 
contribution of revenue sources to general city operations (see Table 8) 
For example, the property tax supplied 8. 7 percent of city revenues 
in 1979 compared to a projected 17. 9 percent without Proposition 13. 55 
Because of the state bail out, the contribution of state subventions 
and grants rose from a projected 10. 7 percent to 12. 6 percent of 
total revenue. However, under AB-8 Pasadena received state funds 
with fewer strings attached than prior to Jarvis-Gann, which seems 
to negate the hypothesis that Proposition 13 precipitated a loss of 
local control. 56 Finally, charges for services supplied 12 percent 
of local city revenues in FY 1979 compared to projections of 9. 5 
percent without Jarvis-Gann. This percentage is likely to rise in 
4 
TABLE 8 
REVENUES BY SOURCE AND FUNDS 
GENERAL CITY OPERATIONS 
Pre-Jarvis-Gann 
Projection FY79 
Properj=y tax $ 9,200,000 
% of t©tal (17. 9) 
Sales lax 6,950,000 
% of t·tal (13. 5) 
u T I ti itf users tax 4,600,000· 
% of t tal (9. 0) 
SLT tax -0-
% of rl (O) 
Other ocal taxes 2,090,000 
% of t tal (4. 1) 
Li<en<�' and pen>i'' 660,000 
% of t tal (1. 3) 
Federa government 11,767,573 
% of total (22. 9) 
State subventions and grants 5,476,887 
% of otal (10. 7) 
Local 2,938,844 
% of (5. 7) 
Charg services 4,896,192 
% of otal (9. 5) 
Finesjand forfeitures 500,000 
% of •Otal (LO) 
Miscelaneous 2,259,250 
% of tl otal (4. 4) 
Total l general city operations $51,338,746 
*City j did not spend available funds 
**Revenue class redefined 
Jarvis-Gann 1 
FY79 
$ 4,118,563 
(8. 7) 
7,530,555 
(16. 0) 
4,704,570 
(10. 0) 
1,506, 770 
(3. 1) 
2,480,800 
(5. 3) 
650,291 
(1. 4) 
8,064,186* 
(22. 1) 
5,969,621 
(12. 6) 
2,064,588 
(4. 3) 
5,635,467 
(12. 0) 
687,505 
(1. 5) 
3, 828, 722** 
(8. 1) 
$47,241,638 
Saurel : City of Pasadena, City Manager's Budget Recommendations FY 1981 
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the future as the per�entage of gross revenues derived from property 
taxes declines and an ordinance adjusting service fees to changes 
in the Consumer Price Index is implemented. 
However, as is apparent in Table 7, the City will not always 
be successful in raising revenue via higher service charges. The 
demand for certain services is elastic. For example, prior to the 
election the directors voted to increase recreation fees by 50 percent 
and thereby hopefully replace $100,000 in lost property. tax revenue. 
Instead the higher fees led to a drop of $123,318 from 1979 projections 
which assumed no increase in fees. 57
The shifting mix of sources in the City's revenue base implies 
a change in the relationship.between the private economy and city 
revenues. AB-8 linked the size of the City's annual state grants to 
the level of state surplus, thereby increasing the sensitivity of 
city revenues . . h b . 1 58 to swings in t e usiness eye e. This suggests that 
both recession and high inflation will_ work to tigh�en local budgets 
in the future. 
Another apparent effect of Jarvis-Gann was to trigger a 
major reorganization of several Pasadena departments (see Table 9). 
These bureaucratic shakeups were not part of the City's preelection 
planning. The Police, Fire and Paramedics were merged into one Public 
Safety Department headed by the former Chief of Police. According to 
the Pasadena's Director of Finance, ". • • the purpose of this and 
other reorganizations was to conserve executive talent and reduce the 
Board of Directors 
TABLE 9 
FISCAL IMPACT OF JARVIS-GANN ON 
DEPAR'.fMENT OPERATING BUDGET 
:Projected FY79 
Pre-Jarvis-Gann 
$ 211,647 
Budgeted FY7i:J 
Jarvis-Gatln 
I $ 192,427 
36 
I �� :  1
_,!l!ll!ll. 3 
11 
City Manager 622,696 . I 558,615 
City Attorney 
City Clerk 
City Prosecutor 
Finance 
H & C. D. 
Public Safety Agency* 
Police 
Fire and Paramedics 
Administrative Services* 
General Services 
M. A. D. 
Personnel (1979) 
256,790 
297,402 
252,714 
2,807,995 
5,962,274 
16,897,577 
10,686,323 
6,211,254 
5,936,221 
749,680 
:::::1: 
I 250,172 
I2,497,118 
5,269,2r 
16, 724,683 
10,245,565 
5,625,08 3 
7,050,845 
!t.l. 21 
L . 14 
.• 00 
I 
llil. l  
,1�. 6  
I .  . 02 
. 1  
. 4  
Community Services* 
Human Services 
Personnel (1980) 
Library 
10,613,945 
7,352,304 
,,,:J, 
= I 
-'1lr 2 
·. 9 
Public Works 
*New departments. 
3,261,641 
11,571,489 
56,180,430 
2,548,079 
 11,737,798 
53,847. 219 
Sources: City Manager's Budget Recommendations FY 1979 (Mayl9,l 197E 
FY 1980 (May 10, 1979). 
. 15 
17 
number of people reporting directly to the City Manager. 11 59 Although 
the reorganization did not result in any layoffs in FY 197 9 and 1980, 
the Finance Director suggested that strong opposition to the Public 
Safety Department from firefighters may have contributed to an 
unsuccessful effort by some community groups to recall three conservative 
Board members. 60
Two other reorganizations also began in 197 9 and were also 
motivated by a desire to conserve executive talent and narrow the 
top of the City's administrative pyramid. Formerly General Services, 
Management Analysis Division, and Personnel were combined into one 
super department called Administrative Services. At the same time, 
Human Services and Library were united into a new Community Services 
department. In an aftershock beginning in FY 1980, Personnel functions 
were again transferred, this time from Administrative Services to 
Community Services. 61 - while the impact of these reorganizations on
administrative costs are uncertain, they have certainly altered the 
bureaucratic politics in Pasadena. 
Incrased power and control has been shifted to the Gity 
Manager as well as the new department heads. 62 In addition, aggrega-
tion of functions into a single administrative unit may make it more 
difficult for directors to relate budget inputs to service outputs 
and in general to monitor the cost of city services. As a result 
increased responsibility for cost effectiveness is transferred to the 
City Manager and his assistants. 
Other aspects of municipal politics will also be affected 
by the reorganizations, particularly the creation of a Public Safety 
38 
and Community Service department. Colilljlunity coalitions sup[potting 
specific services will have to compete directly with other lgr�ups 
for political and organizational leverage within a single 
unit. As a result, the political influence of any one gro�p 
ep.Jtrtme_ 
ill 
reduced. 
1 
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